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Smart Policing: Research Snapshot 
The New Haven, Connecticut, Department of Police Service (NHPD) received a Smart Policing 
Initiative (SPI) grant at a time when local violent crime levels were higher than they had been 
since the mid-1990s and NHPD was operating at reduced force as a result of budget cuts and 
retirements.  
Partnering with a researcher at the University of New Haven, the New Haven SPI team sought to 
address rising violent crime rates and the number of local shooting incidents by increasing the use 
of data-driven decision making in daily police operations. The SPI project would employ 
supplementary foot patrols in the most violent neighborhood in the city, an area called 
“Newhallville.” The intervention would address violence and gun discharges, while also enhancing 
community engagement in Newhallville. NHPD specifically focused on:  
 Outreach and community engagement, especially with block groups;  
 Data-driven, enhanced foot patrols; and  
 A modified problem-oriented policing (POP) technique.  
In July 2013, NHPD began the 13-week intervention of supplementary foot patrols in Newhallville. 
The department’s Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) prepared daily “flash sheets” for officers and 
residents who requested them. These flash sheets were bulletins containing maps, crime data, and 
other information provided by the CAU and other sources. The SPI officers were strongly 
encouraged to make informal contact with community members as frequently as possible.  
Through observation and interaction with Newhallville residents, the officers identified insufficient 
street lighting and neglected properties as two persistent neighborhood problems. And working in 
supervisory roles, the district manager and sergeant leveraged relationships with community 
groups and other city agencies to address these problems.  
Crime trends in Newhallville were compared to those in four comparison neighborhoods chosen for 
their similar histories of violent crime. Comparisons occurred at the neighborhood level and in 
high-risk areas (as defined through Risk Terrain Modeling). Over the 13-week intervention period, 
Newhallville experienced a 19-percent reduction in violent crime neighborhood-wide and a 36-
percent reduction in violent crime within the high-risk areas. In the 13 weeks following the 
intervention, there was a further 41-percent violent crime drop at the neighborhood level and a 56-
percent drop in the high-risk areas. Newhallville was the only neighborhood in the study to see 
period-over-period reductions in violent crime at both levels. While significant differences in violent 
crime were found between Newhallville and some of the comparison neighborhoods, caution should 
be exercised in interpreting the data. 
The New Haven SPI experience presents several lessons learned for both police managers and line-
level officers. For managers, the POP model is adaptable, and departments can modify it to fit 
challenges or situations that are unique to the local community, as New Haven did. Additionally, 
projects like SPI need champions, because personnel changes can challenge project continuity and 
support. For line-level officers, the New Haven SPI revealed that officer input and activity in 
intervention implementation along with accurate data collection and feedback loops are vital. 
Finally, and because lasting change takes time, managers should ensure that line-level officers 
have access to data, as well as to open communication channels, for an active feedback loop. 
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THE NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, SMART 
POLICING INITIATIVE: EMPLOYING EVIDENCE-
BASED POLICING STRATEGIES TO ENGAGE THE 
COMMUNITY AND REDUCE CRIME 
CHRISTOPHER M. SEDELMAIER AND NATALIE KROOVAND HIPPLE  
 
INTRODUCTION1 
In fall 2011, the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance awarded a Smart Policing 
Initiative (SPI) grant to the New Haven, 
Connecticut, Department of Police Service 
(NHPD) and Dr. Christopher M. 
Sedelmaier, its research partner at the 
University of New Haven. The New 
Haven SPI team sought to address rising 
violent crime rates in New Haven by 
increasing the use of data-driven decision 
making in daily police operations.   
 
At the time that NHPD received the 
award, violent crime in the city had 
reached record levels. In 2010, New 
Haven recorded 133 shootings, and in 
2011, the city experienced 34 homicides—
the most in New Haven since 1994. At the 
same time, NHPD was operating at 
reduced force stemming from budget cuts 
and retirements. The department had to 
find ways to better leverage the resources 
available to it in order to address the 
violence. NHPD members viewed making 
more and better use of crime analysis 
                                                
1  Sedelmaier, C. M. “New Haven, Connecticut Smart 
Policing Initiative Report.” University of New Haven, 
2014. 
products in the field as an important part 
of the solution. 
 
To that end, NHPD launched an initiative 
to address the violence and restore 
community-oriented policing practices in 
the department. The SPI project would 
focus on, as data indicated, the most 
violent neighborhood in the city, an area 
called “Newhallville.” The strategies 
employed would focus on addressing 
violence and gun discharges, while also 
enhancing community engagement in 
Newhallville. NHPD specifically focused 
on:  
 Outreach and community 
engagement, especially with block 
groups;  
 Data-driven, enhanced foot patrols; 
and  
 A modified problem-oriented 
policing (POP) technique.  
 
In February 2013, NHPD promoted 19 
officers to the rank of sergeant, all of who 
received training in the basic premises of 
the problem-oriented policing (POP) 
philosophy and the Scanning, Analysis, 
Response, and Assessment (SARA) model 
for problem identification and resolution. 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
With a population of roughly 130,000 
permanent residents, New Haven is 
Connecticut’s second largest city. Home to 
several universities and hospitals, and 
sitting at the junction of I-95 and I-91, the 
city serves as a major activity hub for 
south-central Connecticut. In the years 
leading up to the SPI grant award, violent 
crime had been on the rise in New Haven. 
New Haven was typical of other urban 
communities across the country, as it 
experienced an upsurge in youth violence, 
with an emerging “gang culture” 
identified by law enforcement and school 
officials. A relatively high number of 
reported violent crimes had persisted over 
the five years leading to the grant period, 
including 2011, which witnessed the 
highest number of murders since the 
early 1990s. In addition, New Haven’s 
murder rate in 2011 was the highest in 
the state at 26.2 individuals per 100,000. 
 
Equally troubling was the number of 
unlawful discharges of firearms within 
city limits (Table 1). In 2011, New Haven 
experienced 433 firearm discharge 
incidents, including 148 shootings (34 
percent). The numbers were especially 
concerning in District 7, which contains 
the Newhallville neighborhood. District 7 
led the city in firearm discharge incidents 
in every year since 2007. Clearly, any 
attempt to decrease the violence in New 
Haven needed to include Newhallville as 
a priority area. 
 
 
Table 1. Firearm discharges citywide, broken out by district 
           
Shots Fired 
(NHPD Crime 
Analysis Unit)  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
District 
Totals 
District 1 12 11 16 13 7 12 7 78 
District 2 39 31 38 37 33 17 22 217 
District 3 44 53 53 50 60 40 21 321 
District 4 58 81 70 76 87 102 35 509 
District 5 47 30 32 22 24 13 17 185 
District 6 52 57 46 56 34 15 7 267 
District 7 74 111 163 198 127 108 81 862 
District 8 95 90 134 67 50 50 29 515 
District 9 35 44 36 32 31 23 29 230 
District 10 46 67 70 71 96 53 32 435 
Yearly Totals 502 575 658 622 549 433 280 3619 
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The NHPD Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) 
used data to determine that Newhallville 
should be the focus area for the SPI 
project. The neighborhood’s share of 
violent crimes in New Haven increased 
from 8.5 percent during 2002–2006 to 9.7 
percent during 2007–2011. Newhallville’s 
share of firearms-related crimes (i.e., 
shootings, robberies with firearms, and 
unlawful firearm discharges) increased 
from 10.9 percent during 2002–2006 to 
18.2 percent during 2007–2011. In the 
five years before the project’s inception, 
about 25 percent of all non-fatal shootings 
in the city of New Haven took place in 
Newhallville. Similarly, about 27 percent 
of all unlawful firearm discharges and 4 of 
the 17 murders (24 percent) that occurred 
in New Haven in 2012 took place in this 
neighborhood. Public calls for police 
service also increased, from 6.9 percent to 
7.4 percent between 2010 and 2012.  
 
The neighborhood is home to three major 
gangs, and recidivism among ex-offenders 
living in Newhallville is a major 
contributor to local crime problems. 
 
The CAU generated violent crime location 
quotients (LQCs) for each neighborhood in 
the city, based upon violent crime figures 
from 2002 to 2012. LQCs are ratios that 
allow the crime distribution in a smaller 
geographic area, such as a neighborhood 
or smaller unit of the city, to be compared 
to a reference or base area’s distribution—
in this case, the entire city of New Haven. 
An area with an LQC of 1.0 would have a 
ratio of violent crime versus total crime in 
the same proportion as the city as a whole; 
scores above 1.0 would indicate that the 
area’s share of violent crime is 
disproportionately high relative to the 
rest of the city, while scores below 1.0 
would indicate that the area’s share of 
violent crime is disproportionately low 
relative to the rest of the city.  
 
Newhallville was chosen as the 
implementation area because it had a 
violent crime LQC of 1.72, the highest of 
any neighborhood in the city. In other 
words, Newhallville had 72 percent more 
violent crime relative to the rest of New 
Haven, despite the fact that the 
neighborhood is only 3.3 percent of the 
city’s total geographic area. 
 
LQC scores were also useful in choosing 
appropriate comparison areas for 
assessment—each chosen neighborhood 
scored higher than 1.0. The four 
neighborhoods selected as the comparison 
sites—Fair Haven, Hill, West River, and 
Edgewood—share some similarities with 
Newhallville. Summarized in Table 2, the 
neighborhoods are mostly similar in terms 
of population density, percentage of 
residents living below the poverty line, 
and median income. However, the most 
striking similarity between the five 
neighborhoods is the large percentage of 
minority residents. 
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Table 2. Newhallville and comparison neighborhoods (italicized) at a glance* 
  
 Newhallville Fair Haven West River Edgewood Hill 
Area (square miles) 0.852 1.269 0.746 0.396 1.573 
Population 9,489 15,613 3,964 4,476 16,016 
Density (per square mile) 11,137 12,303 5,314 11,303 10,182 
Violent Crime LQC (2002–2012) 1.72 1.24 1.30 1.19 1.26 
Median Income $39,048 $37,968 $35,286 $40,073 $32,136 
Percent living below poverty line 25% 32% 23% 19% 41% 
Percent Black 85% 21% 63% 55% 37% 
Percent Hispanic 9% 63% 22% 16% 51% 
Percent Asian >1% >1% 1% 2% 1% 
Percent White 2% 10% 11% 16% 10% 
Percent Other  4% 2% 3% 4% 2% 
   * All figures are from the 2010 Census unless noted otherwise 
 
 
II. THE RESPONSE 
Early in his tenure, New Haven Police 
Chief Esserman affirmed his support for 
community policing, declaring that 
officers would return to walking beats and 
would increase the frequency and quality 
of non-enforcement contacts with 
community members. Furthermore, the 
chief was a proponent of the CompStat 
model and data-driven decision making, 
and he sought to better incorporate the 
department’s crime analysis capabilities 
into its day-to-day patrol functions. In 
support of these goals, the SPI team was 
directed to reduce violent crime and gun 
offenses in Newhallville by using a 
combination of directed foot patrol, 
POP, and community outreach and 
engagement. NHPD’s SPI approach was 
built upon the following four pillars: 
 
1. Employing POP techniques to 
engage and involve community 
members in identifying and solving 
neighborhood problems; 
2. Implementing the use of the SARA 
model among officers and using 
crime analysis products (e.g., daily 
flash sheets) to assist them in 
making data-informed decisions in 
the field; 
3. Using Risk Terrain Modeling 
(RTM) to identify high-risk areas 
and direct officer deployment and 
activities during foot patrol; and 
4. Providing stable, consistent 
leadership through a dedicated 
district manager (sergeant) and 
support team to direct problem-
solving measures and bring 
resources to bear upon problems 
identified by the patrol officers. 
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Community Outreach and 
Collaboration 
One of NHPD ‘s major initiatives involved 
an effort to re-engage the community in 
addressing neighborhood problems. The 
city has a strong network of block watches, 
civic groups, and community management 
teams, but NHPD’s communication with 
those groups had waned over time. NHPD 
sought to rejuvenate connection with this 
network of community groups by hosting 
an open meeting at its headquarters for 
all community representatives to discuss 
any issues and requests that they may 
have. The ultimate goals of this inaugural 
meeting, held in June 2013, were to 
strengthen existing relationships between 
NHPD and neighborhood groups, and to 
forge new ones throughout the community. 
The department extended invitations to 
93 known active block watch and 
community management groups. 
 
Following the initial meeting, NHPD 
hosted bi-monthly gatherings at its 
headquarters to maintain contact with 
these community groups. As of January 
2014, NHPD had been in contact with 133 
block watch and community management 
team groups citywide—a 43-percent 
increase over the initial number from 
seven months earlier. Included among 
those groups were 11 block watch groups 
in Newhallville.  
 
After re-establishing contact with the 
community groups, NHPD sought to 
bolster the groups’ capabilities by making 
more resources available for their use. 
The department distributed block watch 
guides to all active block watch groups, as 
well as to individuals wishing to start new 
groups. These guides contained 
information covering the basics of starting 
and effectively administering a block 
watch group, including, but not limited to, 
sample agendas and home security tips. 
NHPD encouraged communication among 
neighborhood groups by creating a 
directory of block watch captains.  
 
Finally, the department began 
distributing a daily flash sheet to the 
community groups and any other 
interested parties. As of May 2016, the 
distribution list includes over 200 
individuals, up from the 133 in January 
2014. The flash sheet contains maps and 
information tailored to the recipient’s 
neighborhood. In cases where the groups 
have provided information regarding 
events in their neighborhood to NHPD, 
this information is also incorporated into 
the flash sheet. 
In Newhallville specifically, the SPI 
officers were encouraged to make informal 
contact with community members as 
frequently as possible, and it was 
important for the SPI officers to be visible 
and accessible to Newhallville residents. 
SPI officers were required to report the 
number of informal contacts with the 
community on their shift activity logs 
(Table 3). On average, officers reported 
making 18 contacts per four-hour shift. 
Anecdotally, the officers frequently noted 
in their logs that residents and business 
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owners were happy to see a police 
presence in the neighborhood, and they 
hoped that the visible presence of NHPD 
officers would continue. The district 
manager reported that it appeared the 
officers were gaining trust through their 
campaign of friendly, informal interaction. 
Moreover, the district manager noted that 
during the SPI project, citizens 
increasingly provided informal tips about 
criminal activity to the officers walking in 
the neighborhood. 
Table 3. Officers’ community contacts and activity counts per shift, with per-shift means* 
 
Type of Contact Min Max Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Citizen Contacts 0 85 3269 17.86 13.906 
Faith-Based Organization Contacts 0 3 62 0.34 0.691 
Local Business Contacts 0 28 621 3.39 3.003 
Neighborhood Organization/Block Watch Contacts 0 4 32 0.17 0.516 
Youth Club/Organization Contacts 0 12 37 0.20 0.959 
Field Interviews Conducted 0 25 242 1.32 3.193 
Call Responses 0 3 73 0.40 0.654 
Arrests Made 0 1 6 0.03 0.179 
Tickets Issued 0 2 7 0.04 0.243 
Violent Crime Incident Responses 0 1 8 0.04 0.205 
Property Crime Incident Responses 0 1 4 0.02 0.147 
Other Crime Incident Responses 0 3 34 0.19 0.479 
   * Total shifts = 183 
 
Risk Terrain Modeling  
The CAU used RTM to determine the 
areas within the target and control 
neighborhoods that showed the highest 
risk for violent crime. The CAU and the 
research partner agreed that this method 
would be preferable to NHPD’s standing 
practice of using the more traditional 
method of defining high-risk areas 
through pin mapping alone. Pin maps rely 
solely upon the location of past offenses to 
predict future incidents. While this gives 
officers a good starting point, it presents 
the events without any situational context. 
By contrast, RTM creates an aggregated 
risk surface (or layer) based on the 
presence and intensity of factors that 
criminological theory and practical 
policing experience suggest may make an 
area more at risk of experiencing the 
offenses of interest. That is, RTM looks at 
crime attractors and the “influence” a 
physical place or the environmental 
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characteristics of a place has on crime 
relative to the local context. As such, the 
officers are doing more than just “chasing 
the dots around the map”; the risk layers 
direct officer activity into areas 
characterized by the confluence of several 
risk factors such as convenience stores, 
gas stations, ATM machines, and gang 
territories. Incidents may move from week 
to week, but the risk layer is relatively 
stable, focusing police activity in areas 
where current criminological research 
suggests that it may have the most 
impact. 
The CAU created risk layers for 
Newhallville and the comparison areas 
using the following variables:  
 
 4.5 years’ worth of NHPD incident 
data, including both violent and 
property offenses;  
 Quality-of-life calls for service (e.g., 
gunshots, noise, drug complaints, 
and vandalism) over the same time 
period;  
 The location of infrastructural 
services that research associates 
with an increased risk of offending 
(e.g., convenience stores, 
restaurants and cafes, package and 
liquor stores, bars, banks, gas 
stations);  
 The location of bus stops;  
 The location of schools; and  
 The known residential addresses of 
ex-offenders (parolees, 
probationers, and other former 
prisoners).  
 
These risk areas accounted for roughly 21 
percent of the total land area in 
Newhallville (86 of 405 total acres). 
The CAU then paired the identified 
primary high-risk areas in Newhallville 
into two beats. Officers would either walk 
a beat comprising the Dixwell Avenue 
corridor (Areas 1 and 4 in Figure 1) or a 
beat comprising the Read 
Street/Huntington Street and Newhall 
Street/Lilac Street neighborhoods (Areas 
2 and 3 in Figure 1). All but Area 4 
included active gang territories; in the 
case of Area 3, nearly every included 
street segment was an identified gang 
territory.  
 
Focused Foot Patrol  
In recent years, foot patrol has re-
emerged as an evidence-based crime-
reduction tactic (for example, the 
Philadelphia Police Foot Patrol2). As part 
of the effort to promote community 
policing in New Haven, NHPD already 
implemented foot patrols citywide before 
the start of the SPI intervention. After 
pinpointing the intervention targets 
through RTM, NHPD assigned 
supplementary foot patrols, working 
overtime, to four Newhallville areas 
identified as being at “high risk” for 
future violent crime incidents by the CAU 
(Figure 1). These patrols were given two 
tasks: engage the community and scan for 
problems tied to the violent crime in the 
area. The overtime shift timing was 
                                                
2https://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=
234 
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guided by the judgment of the district 
manager and informed by CAU data. 
Shifts were four hours in duration and 
were distributed roughly equally 
throughout the days of Tuesday through 
Saturday, over a 13-week study period 
that began in July 2013. There were no 
Sunday overtime shifts and only six 
Monday overtime shifts. 
 
Figure 1. Newhallville neighborhood – top high-risk areas for violent crimes 
Most activity was concentrated in the 
afternoon to evening hours, with patrols 
assigned most often during the 1500–1900 
hour (3:00–7:00 p.m.) and the 1600–2000 
hour (4:00–8:00 p.m.) time blocks.  
Additionally, officers working foot patrol 
overtime in the target areas received flash 
sheets, the daily bulletins that 
incorporated information provided by the 
1 
3 4 
2
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department’s CAU and other sources.3 For 
the SPI project, and with input from the 
newly promoted sergeants, the street-
level flash sheets included information 
about reported offenses, open warrants, 
and neighborhood events occurring within 
the target areas and the neighborhoods in 
general. The flash sheets also included 
directory information on command-level 
staff and key contacts from outside 
agencies (e.g., referral agencies). NHPD 
also distributed the flash sheets’ tailored 
maps and information to community 
groups and any individual who requested 
to be added to the distribution list. 
 
Modified Problem-Oriented 
Policing 
Countless police departments have used 
the SARA model as an effective method4  
for achieving problem-solving goals.5 The 
officers working the focused foot patrols 
became the remote scanners for the New 
Haven SPI project.  
 
These supplementary patrols were funded 
through overtime, which introduced a new 
wrinkle into the project. Police officer 
union rules maintain that all overtime 
assignments must be offered to the 
department at large, with first choice of 
assignment given to the individual at the 
top of the seniority list. The inability to 
                                                
3 Historically, the CAU created flash sheets only for use 
by command staff at CompStat meetings. 
4 D. Weisburd, C.W. Telep, J.C. Hinkle, & J.E. Eck. “Is 
problem-oriented policing effective in reducing crime and 
disorder? Findings from a Campbell systematic review.” 
Criminology and Public Policy 9, 2010: 139-172.   
5 H. Goldstein. “Improving policing: A problem-oriented 
approach.” Crime & Delinquency 25, 1979: 236-258.   
assign a dedicated team of officers to the 
supplementary shifts presented 
considerable challenges, both as a 
practical matter in implementing POP 
practices and in terms of controlling for 
treatment integrity of the foot patrols. 
Given the constant rotation of officers 
through the supplementary beats (i.e., 
officers assigned from the overtime list), it 
seemed as if employing the traditional 
POP model would be incredibly difficult at 
best—how could over 100 officers, most of 
whom would walk three or fewer four-
hour shifts over the course of the project, 
possibly engage in ongoing problem-
solving efforts? Without a stable 
assignment to the Newhallville project, 
individual officers would have little ability 
to engage in problem solving, as 
consistency and long-term commitment 
are essential to such activities. 
Operational realities in New Haven 
required adopting a modified approach to 
POP. 
 
Rather than placing the responsibility of 
the entire problem-solving effort on the 
individual officer, the SPI project instead 
placed the bulk of this responsibility onto 
the district manager and sergeant in 
charge. While individual officers rotated 
in and out of the target areas, the district 
manager and sergeant were a constant 
presence. Officers walking the 
Newhallville beats were tasked with 
problem identification. Some issues could 
be addressed immediately by the officers 
in the field. But when officers identified 
issues that could not be directly and 
immediately addressed, they reported 
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back to either the sergeant or to the 
district manager, who were better 
positioned to engage in longer-term 
problem-solving efforts. At the conclusion 
of each shift, officers completed an 
activity log detailing their community 
outreach and problem-solving activities. 
This allowed the district manager, 
sergeant, CAU, and research partner to 
identify problems that NHPD could begin 
to address through partnership with other 
agencies and community members. This 
division of labor was an innovation born of 
necessity in this case, but it illustrates 
how the more complex aspects of POP can 
be shifted to supervisors with more time 
and resources to effectively engage in the 
SARA model. 
 
In this way, the district manager and 
sergeant used the shift officers as “remote 
scanners” for the SARA process. The 
district manager and sergeant reviewed 
the officer activity logs with the research 
partner and CAU as part of more in-depth 
problem analysis, and then developed 
responses to the problems identified in 
the field. Two classes of persistent 
problems were identified for further 
action: poor lighting on several 
Newhallville streets and properties 
allowed to fall into disrepair. 
 
Common responses to such problems as 
poor lighting and abandoned houses are 
grounded in the principles of Crime 
Prevention Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED). These CPTED 
enhancements often reduce the fear of 
crime and increase a neighborhood’s sense 
of control. And, like POP, such changes 
often require partnerships with the 
community. To address the lighting 
problems in Newhallville, the district 
manager and sergeant adopted a multi-
level approach. In the short term, beat 
officers were instructed to record the pole 
numbers of any street lights found to be 
in disrepair. This information was relayed 
to United Illuminating, the utility 
responsible for maintaining the lights, for 
repair service. After United Illuminating 
repaired the broken lights, beat officers 
identified opportunities to further 
improve neighborhood lighting. Ten 
additional LED street lights were 
installed on Lilac Street, identified as the 
darkest street in the neighborhood. In 
several places, street lights were impeded 
by overgrown tree limbs, limiting their 
effectiveness. The district manager 
contacted the New Haven Department of 
Parks, Recreation and Trees to request 
that limbs be trimmed away from existing 
lighting. Significant tree trimming took 
place on Winchester Avenue and 
Elizabeth Street, improving the existing 
neighborhood’s lighting.  
 
As the improvements to the existing 
lighting were in progress, the district 
manager and sergeant saw an opportunity 
to make long-term changes to lighting in 
the impact areas. The district manager 
reached out to Promise Land Initiative, a 
Newhallville-based coalition of faith-
based organizations seeking to improve 
area conditions, to propose an expansion 
of a current lighting project to other parts 
of Newhallville. The district manager and 
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sergeant saw this as a natural fit for the 
violence-reduction goals that they hoped 
to achieve in the Newhallville impact 
areas. As a result, significant lighting was 
added to Read Street and Newhall Street. 
 
The other frequently identified issue in 
the impact areas was the presence of 
many lots and properties in varying states 
of disrepair. Beat officers noted that 
several lots in Newhallville were 
overgrown and littered with refuse. 
Officers had been approached on several 
occasions by local residents who voiced 
their concerns about the properties. Not 
only were these areas unsightly, but they 
also presented potential opportunities for 
crime (e.g., unsecured vacant buildings 
may be used for illicit purposes) and as 
hazards to public health. In many cases, 
the problem properties were owned by 
absentee landlords living in other states. 
 
Similar to the lighting issue, the district 
manager and sergeant recognized that 
this issue could not be solved by the police 
alone. Rather, this was another situation 
whereby NHPD could team with other 
city agencies to best address the problem. 
The district manager reached out to the 
New Haven Livable City Initiative (LCI), 
a city agency whose goal is to improve the 
quality of life in New Haven 
neighborhoods. Among LCI’s methods for 
accomplishing this goal is promoting the 
enforcement of New Haven’s housing code 
and public space requirements. LCI 
worked with the New Haven Department 
of Public Works to remediate overgrown 
and trash-strewn lots in the neighborhood. 
Furthermore, LCI initiated code 
complaints against properties in violation. 
Working with NHPD, the group also 
sought to better secure vacant buildings 
to prevent them from being used as 
staging points for crime, as well as to 
prevent the facilitation of future offenses.  
 
LCI was not the only group to become 
involved in cleaning up Newhallville. The 
campus of Southern Connecticut State 
University (SCSU) abuts Newhallville on 
the northwest side of the neighborhood. 
The district manager reached out to the 
university to see if it could provide any 
assistance in the clean-up effort. As part 
of a community service project, a team of 
SCSU students cleaned and painted 
property at Lincoln Bassett School, 
located inside one of the high-risk areas at 
the intersection of Shelton and Bassett. 
 
III. ASSESSMENT6  
The research partner assisted NHPD in 
developing logs for tracking SPI officer 
activities during the 13-week intervention 
period. Once the intervention began, the 
research partner met weekly with the 
CAU and the Newhallville district 
manager to review Newhallville 
neighborhood crime statistics and to 
                                                
6  Researchers were aware of a threat to treatment 
integrity relating to a small group of officers who had 
walked six or more shifts. That is, did these officers 
perform differently than the officers who walked fewer 
shifts with regard to problem identification and activity? 
It appears the differences between shifts featuring 
frequently participating officers versus those less 
frequently participating are minimal at best and do not 
appear to be of any practical significance. Access the full 
final report for details. 
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discuss the identified problems and 
possible responses. Together, the SPI 
working group developed a plan to 
measure the impacts of the supplemental 
foot patrol on crime in the areas identified 
through RTM. As the intervention would 
last 13 weeks, the working group sought 
to compare the incidence of crimes of 
interest during the intervention to two 13-
week time periods—one before 
implementation and the second after the 
conclusion of the intervention. The CAU 
tracked the number of major crimes 
(murder, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, motor vehicle theft, theft from 
motor vehicles,   and   firearm discharges) 
in Newhallville, as well as in each of the 
comparison neighborhoods over a total of 
39 weeks. Comparisons of total major 
crimes reported and of violent crimes
 
Table 4. Crime in Newhallville and comparison neighborhoods, broken out by period 
 
 
Pre-
Intervention 
Intervention 
Post-
Intervention 
Pre-Post 
Change 
(Percent) 
Newhallville Grand Total 73 82 49 -32.9% 
 Violence Total 42 34 20 -52.4% 
Hill Grand Total 140 110 87 -37.9% 
 Violence Total 38 50 35 -7.9% 
Fair Haven Grand Total 102 94 82 -19.6% 
 Violence Total 41 34 34 -17.1% 
West River Grand Total 53 34 44 -17.0% 
 Violence Total 14 6 15 7.1% 
Edgewood Grand Total 59 45 42 -28.8% 
 Violence Total 10 10 19 90.0% 
 
were made at both the total neighborhood 
level and for the specific high-risk areas 
within each neighborhood. 
 
Total Crime 
Newhallville’s total volume of crime was 
most comparable to the Hill and Fair 
Haven neighborhoods (Table 4). West 
River and Edgewood, though judged 
appropriate comparison areas based upon 
their LQC ratings, experienced unusual 
calm during 2013 when compared to past 
years. Newhallville initially experienced 
an increase in crime from the pre-
intervention to the intervention period; 
nevertheless, there was an overall decline 
of 33 percent in all crimes from the pre- to 
the post-intervention periods. However, 
there were no statistically significant 
differences in total crime between the five 
neighborhoods during each 13-week 
period.7 
                                                
7 X2 = 10.445; V = .069 
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Violent Crime 
There was a statistically significant 
difference between the neighborhoods in 
the number of violent offenses measured.8 
The statistical significance is based in the 
post-intervention differences between 
Newhallville and Edgewood (Table 4). 
While robbery, aggravated assault, and 
firearm discharge incidents all decreased 
in Newhallville during the post-
intervention period, all those same 
offenses increased in number in 
Edgewood. The Newhallville decrease 
would appear to be driven by a reduction 
in firearm discharge incidents, as robbery 
remained stable and aggravated assaults 
increased only slightly. Seeing a reduction 
in firearm discharge incidents was 
encouraging, as this was one of the 
department’s primary goals for 
Newhallville and a much more common 
occurrence in Newhallville than in any of 
the four comparison neighborhoods. To 
further underscore this point, in each of 
the three periods, the four comparison 
neighborhoods combined did not have as 
many firearm discharge incidents as 
Newhallville had. 
 
However, these results should be 
interpreted with caution. During the post-
intervention period, there was a violent 
crime decrease in Newhallville of 40 
percent from the intervention period. 
Similar results in the post-intervention 
period (October 22, 2013–January 20, 
2014) were found in most cases in the 
comparison areas, suggesting that the 
                                                
8 X2 = 18.669; V = .152 
reductions during that period may be 
attributable, in part, to the onset of 
winter. 
 
High-Risk Areas – Total Crime 
Narrowing the focus to only the high-risk 
areas within each neighborhood serves to 
compound the issue of the low offense 
counts noted earlier in the West River and 
Edgewood neighborhoods. As was the case 
at the neighborhood level, the volume of 
offenses in Newhallville’s high-risk areas 
was most in line with those in the Hill 
and Fair Haven neighborhoods (Table 5). 
During the post-intervention period, two 
of the three higher-count neighborhoods 
saw reductions in total recorded crime. 
There was a slight increase in the Fair 
Haven high risk areas attributable in 
most part to increases in burglary and 
motor vehicle crimes. 
 
The greatest reductions were in 
Newhallville, which saw a near 38-
percent reduction (intervention to post- 
intervention). There were no statistically 
significant differences between the 
Newhallville high-risk area counts  and 
those of the comparison high risk areas.9 
 
In Newhallville, there were decreases in 
each period, the sharpest of which was in 
the post-intervention period. 
 
High-Risk Areas – Violent Crime 
Within the Newhallville high-risk areas, 
all forms of  violent crime decreased 
                                                
9 X2 = 9.333; V = .158 
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Table 5. Crime in Newhallville’s and comparison neighborhoods’ high-risk areas, broken out 
by period 
 
 
Pre-
Intervention 
Intervention 
Post-
Intervention 
Pre-Post 
Change 
(Percent) 
Newhallville Grand Total 38 32 20 -47.4% 
 Violence Total 25 16 7 -72.0% 
Hill Grand Total 64 53 45 -29.7% 
 Violence Total 25 26 14 -44.0% 
Fair Haven Grand Total 20 34 24 20.0% 
 Violence Total 7 6 11 57.1% 
West River Grand Total 11 6 9 -18.2% 
 Violence Total 1 0 5 400.0% 
Edgewood Grand Total 9 5 6 -33.3 
 Violence Total 0 1 1 100.0 
 
during the intervention period. Although 
the counts themselves are relatively small, 
these incidents accounted for a 
considerable proportion of violent offenses 
in Newhallville. In the pre-intervention 
period, nearly 60 percent of all violent 
offenses in Newhallville occurred within 
the high-risk areas. During the 13-week 
intervention, this figure dropped to 47 
percent. A statistically significant 
difference (p ≤ 0.05) was found in violent 
crime in the three remaining 
neighborhoods (West River and Edgewood 
were removed due to zero counts), but 
these results should be treated with 
caution.10 While there was a substantial 
decrease in violent crime from period to 
period in the Newhallville high-risk areas, 
the model’s significance appears to be 
driven in large part by the increase in 
                                                
10 X2 = 10.365; V = 0.194  
robberies in Fair Haven’s high-risk areas 
during the post-intervention period. In 
addition, several zero counts made 
meaningful analysis on violent offenses 
impossible when including those high-risk 
areas. Instead, an analysis was performed 
that included only the higher-count areas 
(Table 5). 
 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED  
The New Haven SPI project was an 
ambitious attempt to make fundamental 
changes to NHPD’s use of data in the field 
to inform day-to-day patrol activity. This 
was a process that was beset by 
challenges from the beginning. At the 
time that the SPI grant was awarded, 
NHPD was a department on the cusp of a 
major leadership change. Not only was 
the entire upper command, including the 
chief’s position, changed in the first six 
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months of the project, but NHPD was also 
shorthanded in terms of uniformed 
personnel for the duration of the project.  
 
Compounding these changes were layoffs 
of sworn officers and a series of 
retirements. Efforts to effect lasting 
organizational change are substantially 
impeded when the organization itself is in 
a constant state of flux. 
 
In conclusion, the New Haven SPI offers a 
number of important lessons learned for 
police managers and line officers, 
described below: 
 
For the Police Manager 
 Projects need champions; use a 
supervisor for consistency.  
 One of the biggest challenges faced early 
in the project was the unsettled nature of 
the     department after a   change    in 
leadership. At one point or another in the 
project, no fewer than three assistant 
chiefs had been the point person for the 
SPI project. Until the situation settled, it 
was difficult to proceed, as priorities could 
change in short order. Therefore, the 
project was somewhat in a state of flux 
during the early days. However, once 
assignments settled, the project quickly 
gathered steam. This was due in large 
part to finding players with solid stakes in 
the project. 
 
 Once the assistant chief was in charge 
and the district manager, who was the 
project supervisor, was in place, the 
stability necessary to proceed was present.  
 
While the New Haven SPI did a great 
deal of good, a program such as this would 
likely enjoy even more success with 
greater continuity in personnel. 
 
The front line needs access to data. 
Having access in the field to crime 
statistics and data regarding current 
neighborhood patterns not only helps 
officers make informed decisions, but it 
also provides a stake for the officer in the 
data-gathering process. Seeing the 
benefits of having good data may 
encourage officers to engage in more—and 
more careful—data gathering while in the 
field. The use of flash sheets takes the 
“With union rules in hiring 
overtime, we utilized the project 
supervisor to be the constant 
within the project. The officers 
would document the observations 
and suggest ideas to better the 
community, and the project 
supervisor would be tasked with 
following up and making the 
suggestions happen. The program 
relied heavily upon the 
observations of the beat cops, but 
they must then be followed 
closely and in a timely manner by 
the supervising officer. It was a 
great team collaboration and 
interesting strategy to work 
within the union contract.”  
-  Sgt. Roy Davis, NHPD, on using a 
supervisor for consistency 
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data that only command level officers are 
exposed to during CompStat meetings and 
puts them in the hands of street-level 
supervisors and line-level officers. The 19 
officers promoted to sergeant in February 
2013 were given the opportunity to assist 
in redesigning the flash sheet in ways 
that they felt would better support their 
daily operations.  
Active feedback loops are essential.  
Ensuring an active feedback loop 
throughout the chain of command can 
foster vested interest in a crime-reduction 
strategy at all levels of the department 
and, ultimately, contribute to successful 
implementation. Incorporating feedback 
into the flash sheet design was just the 
beginning of the feedback loop at NHPD. 
The sergeants were also empowered to 
encourage their officers to use POP and 
SARA techniques out in the field. An 
active feedback loop allows line-level 
supervisors to make adjustments by 
giving them the responsibility and 
authority to incorporate changes revealed 
in the response and assessment parts of 
the SARA model.  
Obstacles can create innovation.  
 The modified POP model used in New 
Haven was initially conceived as a “work-
around” measure to address the fact that 
it would be impossible to keep a 
consistent team of officers in the field for 
the duration of the project. The SPI team 
modified the basic POP model to place 
deeper responsibility for developing 
solutions to the identified problems with 
those who could be a more consistent 
presence. The longer the SPI team had to 
think about the idea the less it seemed 
like a stop-gap measure and more a plan 
of action that was better suited to the 
operational realities NHPD was facing. A 
future site’s internal issues or quirks may 
provide the impetus for innovation beyond 
the original intent of the project. 
Lasting change takes time.  
Changing organizational culture is much 
like turning a cruise ship around in a 
tight harbor—a slow process requiring a 
long series of small adjustments. New 
Haven’s SPI was funded under Area 3 of 
the 2011 SPI solicitation.11 This particular 
area was for projects “seeking to inculcate 
evidence-based policies, procedures, 
tactics, and strategies throughout their 
organization  in  innovative  ways that  
                                                
11 Smart Policing Initiative: FY 2011 Competitive Grant 
Announcement, Bureau of Justice Assistance. 
https://www.bja.gov/Funding/11SmartPolicingSol.pdf  
“From a law enforcement 
perspective, it is an interesting 
concept to use accurate and timely 
crime statistics to maneuver 
walking patrols into the higher-
crime areas in an attempt to 
reconnect with the community, as 
well as address violent crime. To 
see the concept work was even 
more promising for future crime-
prevention tactics within New 
Haven.” 
-  Sgt. Roy Davis, NHPD, on data-driven 
policing 
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reach beyond tactical approaches in one 
area of the department or the community.” 
The intent of the New Haven SPI was, in 
part, to bring data-driven decision making 
to daily operations. With the department’s 
commitment to exposing all levels of 
uniformed personnel to POP and the 
introduction of the flash sheet for line 
officers, NHPD took significant positive 
steps in that direction.  
 To expect a complete shift in the span of 
two years, however, is probably 
unrealistic. Future sites are likely to face 
disappointment if they anticipate 
wholesale change in a relatively short 
timeframe. Therefore, departments 
should set reasonable, incremental goals 
to achieve lasting change. Change is 
happening in New Haven, but at a pace 
that will allow it to take strong root. 
For the Line Officer 
Constructive feedback makes a 
difference. 
 During the POP training delivered to the 
19 newly promoted sergeants, instructors 
tasked the sergeants with critiquing the 
current flash sheet and providing 
suggestions for making the sheet more 
useful to officers in the field. While the 
flash sheet was universally declared to be 
a useful product, several of the sergeants 
suggested adding directory information 
for command-level staff and key contacts 
from outside agencies (e.g., referral 
agencies) to the revised product. These 
suggestions are consistent with POP 
principles in that they facilitate 
communication with agencies that may be 
positioned to support solutions falling 
outside of traditional police response. 
Opening these lines of communication 
may then serve to promote innovative 
thinking about persistent neighborhood 
problems. As noted in the flash sheet 
example, line-level input makes a 
difference.  
Line-level officers play a critical role 
in evaluation. 
The reality is that the line-level officer 
can make or break a crime-reduction 
project on many different levels. 
Evaluation is essential for contributing to 
evidence-based practice in policing and 
criminal justice. And rigorous process and 
outcome evaluations are dependent on the 
actions of the street-level officer. The 
actions of these line-level officers affect 
everything from the fidelity of the 
“While we were forced to take 
any officer who applied for the 
overtime, we observed that after 
taking the first shift and being 
assigned specific jobs, the officers 
enjoyed the program. We saw 
certain officers (not surprisingly, 
the ones who enjoyed the idea of 
community policing) continue to 
take the overtime repeatedly, 
while officers who did not enjoy 
the community policing idea 
rarely took the job again.” 
-  Sgt. Roy Davis, NHPD, on 
overcoming obstacles in hiring 
officers within overtime contract 
rules 
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intervention implementation to accurate 
data collection. Without evaluation, it is 
impossible to determine the effects of an 
intervention with confidence, which in 
turn affects the proper informing of policy 
and practice.  
 
Data collection is an important part of 
evaluation, and researchers working with 
police departments often depend on the 
cooperation of officers working on the 
project. The New Haven research team 
had some success in showing NHPD 
officers that their data-collecting efforts 
had meaning beyond just generating a 
report—it was being used to help NHPD 
be more effective. And, by the end of the 
project, NHPD had a real stake in 
improving the data quality. 
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